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Both Alasdair MacIntyre and Pierre Bourdieu had a fraught relationship to 
Marxism. Intellectually and politically each was differently indebted to 
Marxism. As is often case when the explicit engagement of social thinkers 
with Marxism recedes, intellectual debts are forgotten or obscured, especially 
by academic camp followers seeking institutional respectability. Recurring 
bouts of amnesia and obfuscation invite later epigones to lash intellectually 
bland and politically insipid projects to the masts of their more radical masters. 
These two collections restore a focus on the political commitment of two major 
intellectuals and illuminate the darkened corners of their respective subject’s 
troubled and often neglected relationship to Marxism. 
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Bourdieu and MacIntyre became internationally renowned scholars in their 
own right, MacIntyre as a professional philosopher, Bourdieu as the 
contemporary synthesiser of classical social theory. MacIntyre is best known 
for his elaboration of Aristotilean themes in After Virtue 1988), a work that 
helped to propel him to the front rank of academic philosophy. Bourdieu 
acquired fame for his masterpiece, the sociological study of French ruling 
class culture Distinction (1984). Distinction is not only an incisive empirical 
study of the interrelations of economic and cultural capital but it also 
represents a stunning aesthetic achievement in its own right, as recognised 
by the leading Bourdieu scholar Bridget Fowler: ‘The book cuts between a 
Proustian perspective on the parts of the aristocrats of culture and a 
Proudhonian aesthetic on the part of the skilled working class, in a dizzying 
exercise of perspectival thought that has the scope of a modernist novelist like 
Musil’.1 
 
Bourdieu and MacIntyre were born a year apart, the latter in 1929, the former 
in 1930. Both were therefore in their mid-twenties by 1956 when the workers’ 
rebellion in Hungary threw the Communist Parties in both France and Britain 
into turmoil. Both cut their political and intellectual teeth in the context of the 
Cold War and national liberation struggles. Both saw Stalinism as the 
pathological ideological expression of the coming to power of technocratic 
rule. Both made political interventions in anti-colonial struggles; MacIntyre in 
the early 1970s as the conflict escalated in the north of Ireland, Bourdieu 
through a lifetime’s reflection on France’s colonial policy in Algeria.  
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Propelled by contrasting points of social origin, MacIntyre and Bourdieu 
pursued divergent political trajectories. Bourdieu, the son of a postman in a 
mainly peasant rural community in the French Pyrenees, served time in the 
French Army. He experienced firsthand the embittering effects of French 
colonial policy in Algeria. Bourdieu’s class background, what he called 
‘habitus’, and the Algerian war of liberation deeply structured his political 
commitments even after he became an internationally famous scholar of note. 
In contrast, MacIntyre was born in the militant industrial city of Glasgow and 
was able to combine simultaneously a professional career as an academic 
philosopher and, remarkably, membership of both the Communist Party and 
the Church of England. Unlike MacIntyre, Bourdieu never felt the pull of the 
Communist Party (nor the established church!). While Bourdieu was carrying 
out fieldwork in the stormy violence of Algeria between 1955 and 1960, 
MacIntyre left the Communist Party to take up residence within the British 
New Left. By the end of the decade he had gravitated towards Trotskyism, 
which he saw as the reincarnation of genuine Bolshevism now usurped by 
Stalinism. MacIntyre’s sojourn within British Trotskyism encompassed a year 
with the Socialist Labour League before leaving in frustration over the lack of 
internal democracy and crude anti-New Left sectarianism. In 1960 he joined 
the more congenial heterodox environment of the International Socialist 
group, before beginning a process of disengagement from organised Marxism 
in the mid-1960s.  
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In Alasdair MacIntyre’s Engagement with Marxism, the editors Paul 
Blackledge and Neil Davidson attempt to salvage MacIntyre’s most intensely 
active phase - between 1953 and 1974 - as a committed Marxist intellectual. 
The later date might suggest a mistaken sense of longevity since, as the 
editors show, MacIntyre had already rejected Marx’s crisis theory by the mid-
1960s. When he subsequently broke organisationally with Marxism a few 
years later, at the very moment when the most tumultuous wave of working 
class struggle began to open up internationally, he was merely acting on an 
already established conviction that the working class was a spent force. Of 
more lasting value is a number of articles reproduced here illustrating the 
ethical force of MacIntyre’s earlier Marxism. This achievement is condensed 
by the editors as ‘a historically mediated humanist interpretation of the 
concept of desire’, which promises to connect the ‘strategic lessons of 
classical Marxism to the real desires of ordinary people in their struggles both 
in and against capitalism’.2 Lesser pieces cover book reviews and essays on 
the political and social issues of the day as they were dissected by one of 
British Marxism’s most perspicacious thinkers. 
 
In a political trajectory that contrasts with MacIntyre’s, Political Interventions 
amply illustrates the course of Bourdieu’s activism, which became even more 
acute after his academic reputation was firmly secured. In a reverse of the 
typical biography of the radical intellectual who later becomes disengaged and 
sceptical, the older Bourdieu got the more radical he appeared. Bourdieu 
responded vigorously to the social movement that opened up following the 
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wave of public sector strikes that engulfed France in December 1995. On the 
other hand, he seems to have had far less direct engagement in the 
tumultuous events of May 1968. Political Interventions, however, tracks a 
much lengthier thread of political intervention on the part of Bourdieu from 
1961 until his untimely death in 2002. In so doing, Bourdieu demonstrates a 
greater continuity and consistency of political engagement over the decades 
than is generally acknowledged. His public intervention ranges across 
intellectual autonomy, educational reform, colonial society, neoliberalism, 
sexuality, racism, media, opinion polls, social movements, immigration, terror, 
unemployment, and the state.  
 
 
Political Apprenticeships 
Algeria shaped profoundly Bourdieu’s perspective on the relationship between 
commitment and scholarship. He was not content to passively document the 
empirical shifts in Algerian society or confined to ‘reading the left-wing press 
and signing petitions’. Bourdieu felt obliged to take up a definite position at the 
heart of events – ‘whatever the danger that this might involve’ - as a witness, 
a participant, and a photographer.3 Such close physical proximity to ‘the 
revolution within the revolution’ provided Bourdieu with a molecular analysis of 
the social forces transforming Algerian society. In a 1961 article for Esprit, he 
described how these new realities revolutionised Islam as a traditional source 
of authority and stability: 
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The revolutionary situation also shatters the old hierarchies associated 
with the outdated system of values, substituting for these new men 
whose authority rests more often on quite different foundations than 
those of birth, wealth, or moral or religious superiority. The old values of 
honour crumble before the cruelties of war. The ideal self-image and the 
values associated with it have been put to the most radical test. Like an 
infernal machine, the war has flattened social realities to the ground; it is 
pulverizing and scattering traditional communities – village, clan or 
family.4  
 
While it possessed plenty of explosive material, Bourdieu doubted that 
Algerian society possessed any social group capable of making a 
thoroughgoing social and political revolution. None of the available social 
groups - the peasantry, the sub-proletariat, the unemployed, the 
dispossessed, the petit bourgeoisie, or the relatively privileged urban working 
class - occupied a strategic position that would allow them to exercise 
hegemonic leadership over the rest of society. Instead Bourdieu appealed 
rather vaguely to intermediary groups to act as a bridge to the ‘revolutionary 
rationalization’ of the masses.  
 
In this Bourdieu criticised the complicity with the future Algerian ruling class by 
French intellectuals like Sartre and Fanon. Their romantic activist gestures 
exposed just how out of touch they were with the objective class dynamics 
shaping the struggle. As Bourdieu noted forty years later: 
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Algeria as I saw it – and this was far from the ‘revolutionary’ image given 
by the activist literature and writings of struggle – was made up of a vast 
sub-proletarianized peasantry, an immense and ambivalent sub-
proletariat, a proletariat that was basically established in France, a petty 
bourgeoisie that was quite out of touch with the realities of Algerian 
society, and an intelligentsia whose particular characteristic was a poor 
knowledge of its own society and a failure to understand anything of its 
ambiguities and complexities.5 
 
Bourdieu objected to the fashion among French Marxists coming under the 
gravitational pull of Stalinism to transform ‘the Proletariat’ and ‘the Party’ into 
the metaphysical instruments of ‘History’ and ‘Progress’. Both Sartre and 
Althusser in their different ways represented for Bourdieu the worst aspects of 
the ‘universal intellectual’, standing imperiously above society to summarily 
hand down absolutist verdicts about the human condition or scientific 
procedures. Such a self-willed divorce from concrete reality made the 
Sartrean myth of the universal intellectual the antithesis of Bourdieu’s 
conception of the engaged intellectual.6  
 
MacIntyre took a more generous approach to Sartre, but only as a matter of 
degree. As a social theorist, MacIntryre found Sartre ‘at once brilliant and 
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disastrous’.7 Compared to the dreary (British) empiricism of mainstream 
sociological statistical inferences and limited generalisations, Sartre might 
appear as exciting and daring, denouncing all and sundry, but especially the 
bourgeoisie, for their rank ‘bad faith’. But for all his existential waffle about 
history as an active process of concrete transformation, MacIntyre, like 
Bourdieu, found Sartre wholly ignorant about the elementary facts of social 
life, preferring instead to romanticise the working class and Stalinism. Such 
formalism led Sartre to a terroristic conception of revolutionary groups, closer 
to nineteenth century nihilism and anarchism than to twentieth century 
Bolshevism. As antidote to Sartre’s congenital sociological illiteracy MacIntyre 
sarcastically advised him to stick to writing plays where fewer prohibitions 
would be imposed on a fevered imagination. 
 
Like Sartre, MacIntyre is a professional intellectual by training. But his 
Marxism was more intimately oriented to the organisational demands of praxis 
at a particular historical conjuncture in British society. In MacIntyre’s 
Engagement we find him wading into the philosophical and sociological 
currents and controversies of the 1950s and 1960s. On one side stands 
Stalinism, dogmatic, dismissive and mechanical. On the other, the Marxisant 
New Left and its humanistic idealisation of self-sufficient working class culture. 
In both cases, the empirical working class proves to be a great let down. 
Eventually, MacIntyre himself succumbs to a loss of faith, first in religion, later 
in the self-actualising capacity of the modern working class. 
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In his essay ‘Notes from the moral wilderness’ (1958-9) MacIntyre quarries 
the pathos of renegecy in the figure of the ex-Communist turned moral critic of 
Stalinism. In their time as Stalinists the disillusioned moralist had once 
identified themselves completely with the objective unfolding of the historical 
process. No gap was left between the ‘ought’ of moral principle and the ‘is’ of 
history. As they ascend to the vaulted position of the moral critic, on the other 
hand, there is only the absolute ‘ought’ of moral principle as a personal 
imperative with a purely accidental relationship to great historical forces. 
Arbitrary and subjective, moral criticism eschews any foundation in a general 
theory of historical dynamics. Purely moral criticism meant merely swimming 
with the high tide of liberal apologetics so prevalent in Cold War Britain.  
 
 
Marxism: Christian and Scientific 
Although he views Stalinism and moral criticism as opposite sides of a bad 
coin, MacIntyre reserves his most trenchant critique here, as in other places, 
for Stalinism. In order to salvage Marxist theory as a self-contained 
metaphysical system Stalinism was forced to endlessly reschedule the iron 
laws of history by ad hoc rationalisations and apologia. That socialism could 
not be introduced by the Red Army imposing itself on a subjugated population 
was not entirely understood by former Communists and social democrats in 
the New Left who thought that the British welfare state would bring a measure 
of socialism from above to a largely indifferent but grateful working class. 
Instead, MacIntyre argued for an active class morality that both orders our 
desires and at the same time expresses them. Desire is not understood here 
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as individualised caprice and impulse but those good ends to which 
historically societies have collectively aspired. For MacIntyre the promise of 
the abolition of class society releases human wants and desires, repressed 
since the Protestant Reformation, back into social life to provide substantive 
content to moral rules that have become abstract, coercive and socially 
meaningless. Such a prospect for a common humanity is paradoxically 
brought on to the horizon by a capitalist society that refuses to realise it. 
MacIntyre presents a gregarious form of Marxism in a morality that is 
something to be discovered by collective endeavour and social solidarity 
rather than something chosen haphazardly by individuals or delivered by the 
machine-like progress of History.  
 
In his first published account of Marxism, Marxism: An Interpretation (1953) 
MacIntyre emphasised the fallibility of Marxist theory and the temptations of 
corruption in an organisational piety that ran along similar lines to the trials 
and tribulations of early Christianity. MacIntyre’s is not the standard 
ideological attack on Marxism as a quasi-religious dogma, accepted only by 
true believers. Rather the Christian inheritance of Marxism resides in its 
practical moral commandments and insistence on redemption. Actions are 
justified in both traditions according to the ends they serve. Both also aspire to 
make truth claims, leaving them vulnerable to empirical falsification. To simply 
level the charge of ‘metaphysics’ at Marxism is therefore wholly inadequate. 
MacIntyre’s Marxism turns on the actuality (or not) of proletarian revolution. 
Marxist theory can only ever be verified in practice by changing life.  
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MacIntyre began by trying to be both a Christian and a Marxist but by 1968 
had ceased to be either. Instead he advocated an Aristotelian model of the 
good life composed of small-scale, local communities exercising collective 
rationality as a mode of self-actualisation. In part this is rooted in his 
acceptance of the conventional wisdom on the New Left about a morally good 
‘young Marx’ and a morally dubious ‘late Marx’. MacIntyre adopted the young 
Marx as the moral compass for a Christianity in Cold War crisis: 
 
Religious content must be realised in political terms. But this is exactly 
what the young Marx did in his criticism of religion. Marxism is in 
essence a complete realisation of Christian eschatology.8 
 
While MacIntyre came to embrace Marxism more fully, Christianity continued 
to frame his understanding of the young Marx as the inversion of Hegel’s 
secularisation of Christian theology. Alienation thus becomes a category that 
allowed the young Marx to pass over from ‘quasi-theological to quasi-
sociological explanations’.9 It is to the young Marx that even the elderly 
MacIntyre in the mid-1990s continues to return to inform his conception of the 
good life:  
 
If we are now to learn how to criticise Marxism, not in order to separate 
ourselves from its errors and distortions – that phase should be long over 
– but in order once again to be able to learn from it, then we shall need 
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once more to re-examine Marx’s thought in the 1840s and above all the 
changes in his conception of the relationship of theory to practice.10 
 
MacIntyre identifies an unlikely affinity between the ‘young Doctor Marx’ and 
Doctor Zhivago, the Christian humanist figure in Pasternak’s tragic novel 
about ‘the human substance of the Revolution’.11 On the other hand, 
MacIntyre’s humanism leads him to denounce any pessimistic lingering on the 
negative side of the dialectic.12 This is understandable in his critique of 
Marcuse (although he does tend to overstate the case for the prosecution in 
his little study of Marcuse to such an extent that not much that passes for 
social theory would survive his stringent test of intellectual rigour - no bad 
thing perhaps).13 MacIntyre is on occasion far too sanguine about affirmative 
tendencies within the ethical critique of capitalism. His Marxism is future-
oriented, pointing to the positive possibilities already inherent to contemporary 
reality. But, in the end, when these potentialities did not become operative in 
the ways predicted MacIntyre walked away from Marxism to embrace a 
radical communitarian vision.  
 
While he also shared MacIntyre’s affinity for the early Marx, especially the 
Feurbach theses, Bourdieu’s engagement with Marx also appealed to the so-
called ‘scientific’ late Marx. Individuals are important in Bourdieu’s corpus in 
so far as they are ‘personifications’ of generic positions or dispositions. In the 
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case of the cultural underpinnings of class society it is not for the social 
scientist to engage in ‘the ritual conflict’ of ascribing value judgements to 
cultural objects, say by voicing a preference for dubstep music rather than 
opera, but to analyse the objective social structure that awards merit to one 
thing rather than another. By stressing empirically verifiable social regularities 
and probabilities, Bourdieu lacked MacIntyre’s optimism of the intellect and 
has been frequently accused of pessimistic resignation. But while MacIntyre’s 
ethical optimism led to political pessimism, Bourdieu’s intellectual pessimism 
supported an active political optimism. As Bourdieu put it: ‘Giving power to 
imagination can also mean painting the dictionary red’.14 Many of the articles 
and interviews collected here function as effective rejoinders to reproaches 
about Bourdieu’s supposedly excessive analytical pessimism and his wildly 
positive, voluntaristic support for all forms of movements resisting worldly 
domination. Sober knowledge of the social world – not an optimistic theory of 
human nature - is viewed by Bourdieu as the indispensable foundation for 
critical thought and action.15  
 
Although Bourdieu relied heavily on Marxist categories of class, ideology, and 
capital he evinced no programmatic commitment to Marxism. If Bourdieu 
refused to identify himself as a Marxist this was in a context where Marxism 
meant whatever the French Communist Party and its fellow travellers said it 
was. If that was Marxism, then Bourdieu was no Marxist. Stalinist 
pronouncements on class typically lacked precision, hence the ‘big cannon 
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balls’ of class interests were ‘always aimed too high’ by ‘the Marxist heavy 
artillery’.16 Bourdieu saw truth as antagonistic rather than monistic, a 
perpetual struggle between knowledge as objective structure and subjective 
construction. Bridget Fowler has done more than most to locate Bourdieu 
within the non-dogmatic tradition of classical Marxism.17 Rather than lapsing 
into theoretical eclecticism, Fowler argues that Bourdieu creatively deploys 
Pascal, Weber, Durkheim, Wittgenstein and Nietzsche in productive 
encounters with classical Marxist theory. Other critics are much less 
convinced by Bourdieu’s Marxism. Some see him as lacking any systematic 
sense of capitalism as a social whole. Bourdieu is also found guilty by critics 
of a highly deterministic view of working class life, as class completely lacking 
subjective agency in its objective domination by cultural and ideological 
structures. More routinely, he is coveted as a radical ornamentation for purely 
scholastic projects.  
 
Political Interventions is a corrective, if it were needed, to any lingering sense 
that Bourdieu’s constructivist oeuvre lacked any conception of subjective 
action leading to social and political change. Unlike MacIntyre’s Marxism, 
Bourdieu’s approach to class relations was indebted neo-Kantian sociology as 
much as Marx. ‘Basically, all I have done is to take seriously Durkheim’s idea, 
in a Marxian transposition, that logical classes are social classes’.18 A logic of 
theoretical representations organises the world into classes at least as much 
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as structured relations to the means of production. To view class as a thing-
like substance, as certain Marxists are prone, is to court reifying in theory 
what are actively structured social relations. As Bourdieu often paraphrased 
Marx, this merely confuses ‘things of logic’ for the ‘logic of things’. Theory is 
mistakenly transformed into a metaphysics of practice.  
 
Classification is therefore a key stake in the struggle between classes. Class 
is both precondition and consequence of classification, both material condition 
and subjective consciousness. Consciousness becomes part of the objective 
conditions of class, which in turn gives rise to antagonistic representations. 
This much was recognised by Marx’s Theses on Feurbach but later Marxism, 
for Bourdieu, failed to sufficiently recognise that its own theory of classes itself 
made possible a conception of society as class divided. ‘The paradox of 
Marxism is that it has not included in its theory of classes the theoretical effect 
that the Marxist theory of classes has produced and that has contributed to 
making it possible for something such as classes to exist today’.19 Bourdieu 
did not seek to resolve the tension involved in marrying a Durkheimian notion 
of representation with a Marxist notion of class relations. He sought to raise it 
to the level of a creative contradiction.  
 
Well represented in this collection is Bourdieu’s abiding concern with the 
contradictions of educational reform. Educational institutions in France 
depended on a ‘Jacobin ideology’ that allowed certain criticisms to be made of 
the education system so long as its socially conservative function was left 
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unscathed.20 Social conservatism functions through education to reproduce 
the existing distribution of class entitlements and rewards. For Bourdieu, 
education can only become a universal good if the economic and social 
conditions on which it is premised are themselves universalised. In the fight to 
actualise universalism against both ‘rational absolutism’ and ‘antiscientific 
nihilism’ political struggle is necessary in what Bourdieu terms the ‘realpolitik 
of reason’.21 MacIntyre made a parallel diagnosis of the class function of 
British education, where formal equality in education functions as a 
mechanism for perpetuating class inequalities, something perhaps even more 
true forty years on: ‘working class people will gradually learn that they are still 
to be excluded, and that in streamed comprehensive schools and expanded 
universities, it will still be the case that all the advantages lie with children of 
middle class parents’.22 For Bourdieu, the student revolt of 1968 misfired to 
the extent that the main victims of education’s role in the reproduction of class 
society were more or less systematically excluded from higher educational 
institutions.  
 
As any genuinely shared vision for education gets lost all that is left is the 
unbridled competition in the individual scramble for market position. More 
recent student revolts protest against neoliberal education as a surrogate for 
cut-throat market competition for high grades, studying the right subject at the 
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right school, and exam mania.23 At the behest of the Mitterand government in 
1984, Bourdieu drew up ‘Proposals for the Future of Education’ in support of a 
range of practical measures to advance a genuinely democratic intellect 
through a much needed reform of the technocratic educational system. 
Instead, technocracy entrenched itself more deeply, applying ideological fixes 
such as economism and technological fetishes like computing to remedy 
economic and social problems. Economism as the ideology of technocracy 
fails to account in its cost-benefit balance sheet for the magnitude of 
unredeemed social suffering. Bourdieu expected this situation to break down 
under the weight of its own contradictions: ‘when rats are subjected to a 
treatment like that inflicted today on teachers and researchers, distributing 
electric shocks and grains of wheat haphazardly, they go mad’.24 As 
managerialism and technocracy run rampant in Britain’s ‘business-facing 
universities’ Bourdieu’s analysis remains apposite. Business is more exalted 
than science, while the bullying boss is presented as a human ideal. 
Academics are maddened by arbitrary legitimations and the spectacular 
salaries of those that occupy the top rung of the academic cage. Seemingly 
‘technical choices’ (like ‘quality assurance’) about institutional practices (or 
‘governance’) or criteria for reputational eminence – ‘the interest of disinterest’ 
- are never socially neutral: they repeatedly favour the already well favoured.25  
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The Philosopher’s Gamble 
As MacIntyre began to take his leave from Marxism he claimed that Marx’s 
individual theses had been refuted by empirical changes in the nature of 
capitalism. These shifts had deepened the internal stratification of the working 
class into sectional competitors rather than potentially revolutionary 
collaborators. Echoing Bourdieu’s sentiments, MacIntryre would later claim 
that Marxism was doomed in any case by internal theoretical inconsistencies 
and errors as result of the lessons of the Theses on Feurbach falling into 
neglect. But if he considered the renewal of Marx’s Feurbach Theses so 
critical this, surely, was as much the responsibility of MacIntyre as anybody 
else. After all, who educates the educators? 
 
In a review of Lucien Goldman’s The Hidden God, MacIntyre drew close to 
accepting some form of decisionism as an inevitable part of the human 
tragedy.26 In his Romantic anti-capitalist phase, the young Georg Lukacs, 
coming under the influence of Simmel’s attempt to build psychological 
foundations for historical materialism, advanced a tragic view of cultural 
decay. Under the commodity system humanity suffers a grievous loss of 
meaning. Lukacs, argues Goldman, is faced with a prospect analogous to that 
which confronted Pascal during the crisis of faith in mid-seventeenth century 
Christian theology: how to resolve a crisis of belief in a world without meaning. 
For Christians God’s other-worldly power is hidden by the phenomenal world. 
Pascal refused to restore meaning to this world through a rational verification 
of the existence of God, a mistake made by Descartes’ Christian apologetics. 
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Instead, only by gambling that God exists in an eternity without guarantees - 
the famous Pascalian wager - can meaning be restored to the 
disenchantment of being forced to live in this world without spirit. 
 
By extension, for Hegel, Marx and Lukacs (and MacIntyre) being in the world 
already imposes decisions on us, in this case the wager of making history 
rather than believing in God. For the Lukacs of History and Class 
Consciousness, the Marxist wager on the proletariat would still hold true even 
if it was empirically disproved in an unshakeable belief or ‘scientific conviction’ 
in the dialectical method. MacIntryre diagnosed with rare panache in his 
essay ‘Breaking the chains of reason’ (1960) the moral and rational force of 
the wager against the intellectual’s suspicion of commitment. Here the wager 
is represented on one side by Keynes, ‘the intellectual guardian of the 
established order’, and, on the other side, Trotsky, the hunted defender of 
rational, proletarian self-activity. Trotsky embodies the full implications of the 
tragic majesty in the Pascalian wager.  
 
I think of them at the end, Keynes with his peerage, Trotsky with an 
icepick in his skull. These are the twin lives between which intellectual 
choice in our society lies.27 
 
For MacIntyre the exiled Trotsky was no futile patron saint, still less Isaac 
Deutscher’s ‘prophet outcast’, but the kindred spirit of Marx, the activist-
intellectual holed up in the British Museum.28  
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Negative examples of the wager for MacIntyre are the cases of the radical 
sociologist C. Wright Mills and anti-imperialist fighter Che Guevara. Mills was 
an inveterate critic of the ‘men of power’ in the US ruling elite (note, not the 
ruling class). As such, he wagered on the need for a new, more enlightened 
elite, but an elite nonetheless. Mills wanted to replace the dominant 
legitimations of the old elite with the legitimate domination by a new elite, a 
top-down managerialism by ‘the right people’ carrying through the right 
decisions.29 For MacIntyre Mills failed to take seriously enough working class 
self-activity as constitutive of social reality. In its place Mills was seduced by 
the idealised self-image of the US as a virile democracy composed of small 
scale, face-to-face publics, a model that bears striking similarities to the 
radical communitiarianism adopted by the later MacIntyre. In yet another 
negative example of the wager Che Guevara continually appealed to heroic 
but abstract moralism in the spirit of sacrifice necessary for the struggle 
against imperialism.30 MacIntyre mobilises Marx’s famous judgement on the 
pathos of politically backing entirely the wrong horse based on a redundant 
form book: ‘Don Quixote long ago paid the penalty for wrongly imagining that 
knight errantry was compatible with all economic forms of society’. Both Mills 
and Guevara, heroes of the New Left, made their wager with outmoded forms 
of moral conduct and failed social analyses. These were no Pascalian wagers 
but Quixotic refusals to confront the hidden potential of the reality concealed 
by modern capitalism: working class self-activity. 
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  MacIntyre, ‘Marxism of the will’ (1969), MacIntyre’s Engagement. 
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What sort of wager does MacIntyre derive from Pascal, Hegel, Marx and 
Lukacs? For the editors, the tragic human condition imposes some form of 
decisionism as inevitable: 
 
One way or another we all make the wager, and those who do not bet on 
the proletariat are compelled to retreat back to the tragic vision: if we 
reject Marx, then we are doomed, therefore, to fall back into one form or 
another of the incommensurable ethical perspectives dominant within 
bourgeois society.31 
 
MacIntyre, they continue, simply changed his bet. With no foundational theory 
of human nature to ground his wager on Marxism, the editors argue, 
revolutionary commitment became for MacIntyre yet another more or less 
arbitrary decision to be taken. Conversely, rather than the notion of the wager 
providing an alternative to the tragic vision the exact reverse is the case: in 
the gamble of the Pascalian wager tragedy finds its re-enchanted expression. 
Modern fideism however operates in severely exposed shallows. Compared 
to seventeenth century Christians who gambled everything on the existence 
of God, MacIntyre seems to have made a thoroughly modern wager, one that 
does not demand so much of a commitment that it could not be changed in 
short order if conditions subsequently take an unfavourable turn (and in the 
1960s ‘conditions’ appeared far from unfavourable!). MacIntyre’s decisionism 
seems in retrospect to be more a matter of the pragmatism that he lambasts 
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in others than the unyielding burden that characterises the Pascalian wager of 
Marx or Trotsky.  
 
Across the writings collected here MacIntyre oscillates between a wager on 
the proletariat and a wager on the dialectical method. MacIntyre changed his 
bet not out of a personal temperament that favoured caprice but one 
committed to a faith in reason confined by definite historical conditions. Far 
from lacking a theory of human nature, MacIntyre in fact subscribed to one all 
along, young Marx’s notion of praxis as sensuous-practical consciousness. 
His version of historical materialism avoided contact with foundational 
humanism, really naturalism, which for MacIntyre must fall back into an infinite 
regress. Naturalism can never therefore perform its allotted function as the 
juridical court of final appeal. Throughout many of the pieces collected here 
MacIntyre attempts to hold these wagers on class and method together in the 
revolutionary praxis of open-ended forms of action - now precondition, now 
consequence – that Marx outlined in the Theses on Feurbach.32 It may be that 
the gap between the ethical appeal of the early Marx and the empirical reality 
of a politically stunted working class proved too great for MacIntyre: he 
preferred to twist rather than stick with the hand that history dealt. 
 
 
Autonomous Sociology 
Bourdieu roundly rejected fideism as way to ground political commitment. His 
residual republicanism would have sociology trump once and for all Christian 
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humanism and, by extension, MacIntyre’s Christo-Marxism: ‘Social science is 
happy to destroy the pretences and prevarications forged by a religious vision 
of humanity, of which the revealed religions have no monopoly’.33 This 
depends not so much on being forced to take a gamble by the void of 
meaning in a disenchanted world than on the rational casuistic of general 
theory attentive to specific cases. It is therefore necessary, Bourdieu argues, 
to make ‘a strong distinction between a critique that is ‘decisionist’, arbitrary, 
and the kind of critique implicit in the very logic of research because it is the 
condition for the construction of its object, because research forces the 
accepted self-evidence to be turned upside down’.34 This is Pascalian in a 
sense different from MacIntyre’s wager in that Bourdieu takes up a concrete 
standpoint in defence of the autonomous intellectual field as an absolute 
precondition for public intervention.35  
 
It is less a matter of self-conscious, rational deliberation than it is of being 
thrown into the game of chance as the hidden effect of the concrete 
positioning in social life. For Pascal, it is absurd to see the wager as a heroic 
self-conscious decision to act. Pascalian intellectuals are likened to the 
‘thinking reed’, physically wretched and puny but also capable of greatness 
through reason and consciousness. Commitment does not follow logically in a 
straight line from scholarly analysis, as many intellectuals like to flatter 
themselves; indeed the reverse may be just as true. Meaning cannot be 
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created out of nothing but moral fortitude, as scholastic dogma contends. It 
depends on sensuous practice in a world which has already ensnared us in 
the game of chance. From the deed the belief follows. In the fight for the 
‘realpolitik of reason’, committed intellectuals are both inside and outside, 
neither retreating to the scholastic solitude of the ivory tower nor collapsing 
themselves into worldly instrumentalism. 
 
Public commitment premised on the autonomy of an intellectual field protects 
against withdrawal into scholastic obscurantism. Bourdieu’s model of 
intellectual transcendence is Zola’s ‘J’accuse’ intervention in the Dreyfus 
affair, part of an image of the public intellectual in opposition to scholastic 
obscurantism in France going back to Voltaire’s ‘man of letters’. Intellectual 
autonomy must be defended from the conformist encroachments of 
technocratic expertise bought by the patronage of the neoliberal state. 
Intellectual autonomy makes possible irreverence towards all forms of power, 
embodied for Bourdieu in Michel Foucault’s rejection of ‘the division between 
intellectual investment and political commitment’. Foucault became a self-
styled ‘specific intellectual’ against the Sartrean myth of the ‘universal 
intellectual’ who had already rigged the odds of the bet in their favour, a 
mystification all too familiar on the left.36 Against this false polarity, Bourdieu 
came to advocate an internationalist collective intellectual released from the 
reactionary limits of national one-sidedness that became so threatening to 
critical thought following the collapse of the Stalinist regimes. Autonomous 
intellectuals who intervene publicly rest their authority to speak from their 
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specific expertise. This, Bourdieu believed, allows the maximum scope for 
critical independence and freedom from powerful interests: ‘the only possible 
basis for a power that is specifically intellectual and intellectually legitimate, 
lies in the most complete autonomy in relation to all existing powers’.37  
 
Autonomy and objectivity are of the first order for legitimising Bourdieu’s 
political interventions, which some British social scientists view with 
embarrassment as the typical gesture of the French intellectual. Closer to 
Gramsci’s conception of the traditional intellectual (in the process dispensing 
with the ‘myth’ of the organic intellectual) such autonomy allowed Bourdieu 
(and Foucault) to marshal the support of French trade unionists for 
Solidarnosc in Poland in 1981 against the complicity of the French CP. In this 
context international solidarity was deemed essential to break with the 
national tailism of the hack Party intellectual who attempted to dignify every 
disgrace perpetrated by Stalinism.38  
 
As Bourdieu reminds us in the articles, interview and speeches collected here, 
this has to be constantly fought for against the anti-intellectualism of external 
institutions like the church, state, corporations or mass media.39 He was fond 
of quoting Spinoza to the effect that ‘there is no intrinsic force in the truth’. 
Intellectuals have to compete in a game ‘dominated by the media-political 
                                                 
37
  Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Intellectuals and established powers’ (1985), Political 
Interventions, p. 132. 
38
  Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Rediscovering the left’s libertarian tradition’ (1981), Political 
Interventions. 
39
  Pierre Bourdieu, ‘For an international of intellectuals’ (1992), Political 
Interventions. 
 26 
logic of cultural fast food and the bestseller’.40 Such is the domination of the 
public sphere by hack, glib and cliché-ridden journalism that Bourdieu 
despaired of the lack of status for a ‘competent discourse on social affairs’.41  
 
[The media-intellectual] complex is a real Trojan horse, seeking to 
introduce into intellectual life and public space the logic of show 
business, a cynical quest for visibility at any price and a traffic in 
symbolic capital.42 
 
Too often the powerful who are short on thoughts call on thinkers who are 
short of power. Intellectual autonomy is further frustrated by an institutional 
consecration of arbitrary and facile criteria of academic achievement that too 
often distracts scholars from the necessary ‘patient work and long obscurity 
that major work presupposes’.43 Because there can be ‘no compromise in 
matters of truth’, Bourdieu’s is the self-interested defence without illusions of 
the autonomy of a privileged social world of intellectual production.44 
 
For exposing the Jacobin ideology in education Bourdieu was viciously 
attacked by the French Community Party. Their denunciation of Bourdieu was 
a reaction to the trauma felt by many Stalinist intellectuals who believed 
deeply in the ‘merit’ conferred by their own personal educational success 
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stories.45 Dubbed by Bourdieu ‘the miraculously saved’, Stalinist 
educationalists were overtaken by a rebellion of students that they had 
already diagnosed as failures of bourgeois origin. Neither did they take well to 
Bourdieu’s books The Inheritors (1964) and Reproduction in Education 
(1970). These studies exposed the underlying social, that is to say class 
determinants of educational ‘merit’, a critique that was supposed to be the 
exclusive property of Communist intellectuals. Hence Bourdieu’s analysis had 
to be neutralised by Christians and Communists alike to conceal their 
undeclared stake in the game to keep the Jacobin ideology going.46 Stalinist 
intellectuals and politicians, Bourdieu contended, depend for their existence 
on the political resignation of the working class all the while falsely imputing to 
them a class majesty and moral nobility. Behind all the comical pomposity of 
the General Secretary, Bourdieu detected the dominant legitimations being 
played out in the most absurdly grandiose ways as a technique to reinforce 
working class passivity and subordination.  
 
But it was no joke when, in the mid-1990s, alongside Jacques Derrida and 
others, Bourdieu protested against vindictive state restrictions on the entry to 
France of Algerians escaping violence and repression.47 In these final six 
years of his life Bourdieu was more active than ever in supporting the social 
struggles that exploded in 1995. With the Communist Party sidelined, centre 
stage was taken by striking transport workers against pension reform and the 
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mass movement against social security reform in ‘the Juppe plan’. Now 
neoliberalism entered the frame as the greatest danger to public services, 
intellectual autonomy and a modicum of non-commodified existence. 
Bourdieu saw the situation as particularly urgent, a desperate holding 
operation against market domination.48 A full quarter of the book is devoted to 
these few years as one movement - students, the unemployed, homosexuals, 
anti-racism - gave rise to another. Bourdieu hoped that a European social 
movement would emerge to defend and extend the idea of Social Europe.  
 
 
Snapshots of commitment 
Apart from a generational coincidence, a number of parallels between 
Bourdieu and MacIntyre suggest themselves. Unexpected correspondences 
occur whenever MacIntyre analyses the molecular structure of British society, 
often to striking effect, or where Bourdieu undertakes philosophical 
investigations to enliven and ground empirical studies. However, MacIntyre’s 
political journalism relies on optimistic sketches of class society that naturally 
compares unfavourably to Bourdieu’s more rigorous sociological studies, such 
as his profoundly negative sociological testimony to neoliberal inhumanity, 
The Weight of the World (1993). This professional grounding deeply informs 
Bourdieu’s more political writings, just as MacIntyre’s is informed by a more 
general philosophical conception. Bourdieu’s philosophical ruminations prove 
more substantial and lasting than MacIntyre’s sociology.  
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The New Left figure appeared to MacIntyre as a kind of ‘photographic 
negative of Stalinism’. But just as talk about photographic negatives is 
redundant in the age of digital technology, many of the personalities and 
events discussed by MacIntyre in the 1950s and 1960s have an antique feel 
about them, magnified since the Stalinist universe is no longer ours and being 
placed alongside his more lasting contributions to Marxist ethics. In the case 
of Bourdieu, Political Interventions is constructed like a photomontage 
composed of snapshots of resistance. A shifting sense is given of forty years 
of intellectual and political commitment on many fronts. Its overall effect is that 
under actually-existing crisis of neoliberal society the history of ‘the realpolitik 
of reason’ has yet to be written. As Stalinism entered decline Bourdieu’s 
agnostic Marxism became bolder. He took aim at neoliberal capitalism rather 
than the rather amorphous notion of technocracy that so concerned many 
French social theorists. If MacIntyre’s Engagement is a solemn, chronological 
tribute to the former Marxist, Political Interventions represents a modernist 
construction of finite fragments of Bourdieu, the non-Marxist Marxist.  
 
Both of these collections are important contributions to reflexive praxis today. 
They demand political engagement from the intellectual as a ‘thinking reed’ 
confronted by a vast accumulation and destruction of social potentiality. 
Between them an effort is made to round out and deepen the classical Marxist 
inheritance. In neither case is success seen as a purely a theoretical matter. 
MacIntyre’s Marxist ethics and Bourdieu’s realpolitik of reason are 
unredeemed deposits left lying on the counter for historical materialism to 
 30 
assimilate as part of the renewal of effective social and political 
transformation.  
 
